IASME: Information Security Management Evolution for SMEs by Henson, Richard et al.
IASME: Information Security Management evolution for SMEs,  
 
Richard Henson, Worcester Business School,  
Daniel Dresner, Head of Information Assurance NCC,  
David Booth, Independent Security Consultant  
 
1. Abstract  
 
Most of the research in information risk and risk management has focused on the 
needs of larger organisations. In the area of standards accreditation, the ISO/IEC 
27001 Information Risk Management standard has continued to grow in acceptance 
and popularity with such organisations, although not to a significant extent with 
SMEs. An interesting product recently developed for ENISA (European Nations 
Information Security Association) based on the Carnegie-Mellon maturity model and 
aimed at SMEs has not so far filled the gap. 
 
In this paper, a researcher and two practitioners from the UK discuss an innovative 
development in the UK for addressing the information assurance needs of smaller 
organisations.  They also share their perceptions about the security of national 
information infrastructures, and concerns that SMEs do not get the priority that their 
position in the supply chain would suggest they should have. 
 
The authors also explore the development and roll out of IASME (Information 
Assurance for SMEs), which they have developed in the context of a tight market, 
where spare cash is in short supply, and many SMEs are still in survival mode. The 
question for the business is therefore not seen as “can we afford to spend on 
information security” but “can we afford not to spend…” As well as the effect on 
being able to do business at all of having an SMEs systems compromised, there are 
also matters of reputation, and the growing threat of fines as a result of not complying 
with laws and regulations. 
 
The paper concludes with achievements of real businesses using the IASME process 
to cost-effectively achieve information assurance levels appropriate for themselves. 
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IASME came about as a result of a successful bid to the UK Technology Strategy 
Board for funding on an Information Infrastructure Protection project (Technology 
Strategy Board, 2009). The makeup of the consortium is believed to have contributed 
to the success of the bid, in that it provided research facilities (University of 
Worcester), development expertise (David Booth) and business structure (National 
Computing Centre). This is reflected in the contributions to this paper. The focus of 
the project has initially been SMEs in the West Midlands of the UK, and supporting 
them in the setting up management systems for their information security (ISMS). 
Previous research (Coles-Kemp & Overill, 2007) had previously shown that the 
setting up of an ISMS was considered to be problematic for many SMEs. 
 
The information security of SMEs is important not just because the business itself 
could have its vital information compromised and infringe Data Protection legislation 
(EU, 1981; HMG, 1998) and/or go out of business, but also because of the links that 
SME will have to other businesses across the supply chain. An alert to supply chain 
vulnerability, and its potential for exploitation by CyberTerrorists, was first identified 
after the 9/11 attack (Sheffi, 2001), and recent research has shown that up to 1/3 of 
security incidents are caused by vulnerabilities in links with external partners. It is 
therefore not just in the interest of a given SME to have an effective ISMS, but also in 
the interest of every other business that has dealings with that SME. 
 
In spite of this, surveys consistently show the low priority of information security and 
its management (or assurance) within SMEs. The authors of this report were 
dismayed that high profile UK security breaches that caused great embarrassment to 
the organisations concerned (Nationwide, 2007; HMG, 2007) had little impact on 
SMEs. It was suspected that the 2007-8 recession and the need to demonstrate ROI 
for any expenditure were responsible (Henson & Hallas, 2008), but there was no 
evidence of any change in SME behaviour in this respect as the effects of the 
recession began to subside (Arthur, 2009). 
 
 
3. The Development of IASME 
 
The IASME consortium was already aware of the lack of research available on the 
reasons why SMEs were reluctant to develop ISMSs, and to expand of this body of 
knowledge was part of the brief for the project. Findings relating to SMEs are 
summarised in the IASME Research document (IASME, 2010). Research updates 
continued throughout the funded part of the project, and the scrutiny of private sector 
surveys on aspects of information security continues to present day. Consequently, 
and in the light of new experience, the IASME process and standard are continually 
under review. 
 
The R & D phase of the project had the following stages: 
 
1. Relevant research on information security in SMEs 
2. Development work based on principles of ISO/IEC 27001 and research 
findings 
3. Piloting the developed IASME model with typical SMEs 
4. Modification and re-piloting of the IASME model to produce a service 
and product that can be used to help SMEs to cost-effectively create 
their own ISMSs. 
 
The next stage (current) is the development of a business model, and launching and 
marketing of IASME as a commercial product with associated services to support 
SMEs wishing to have robust information security. At the time of writing, the product 
has been launched, and a business model has been devised.  Marketing and promotion 
will follow.  
 
 
3.1 Research Phase 
 
This was unlike conventional academic research, because the majority of available 
research on information security has been conducted by governments and in the 
public sector. The apparent lack of academic interest in information security has been 
reported elsewhere (Fomin & deVries, 2008). The multidisciplinary field known as 
“Economics of Information Security” has flourished in recent years, although it only 
received greater prominence in the UK from 2007, when a massive security leak in a 
government department hit the headlines (HMG, 2007). The annual WEIS conference 
was held in the UK in 2009, but none of the papers accepted focused on security 
needs of SMEs. This provoked one of the authors to analyse contributions to this 
esteemed conference over the previous seven years (Appendix 1), This revealed no 
papers with SME or SMB in the title out of a total of 160 papers delivered. It may be 
that some of these papers involved SMEs in their content, and this informal exercise 
was just intended to highlight the lack of research. 
 
Thankfully, there have been a number of academic contributors to the debate in recent 
years, and some useful research on information security management habits of SMEs 
has been undertaken. However, SME is a broad term, and no research appeared to 
have been done that looked at differences between the three groups identified by the 
EU, classifying by no. of employees (EU, 2005). There are SMEs all over the world, 
and there are different classifications of size. At a previous Atiner SMEs conference, 
there was a certain amount of disagreement about what constituted an SME, and 
indeed in North America the normal terminology is SMBs (small and medium sized 
businesses) with maximum sizes of 100, and 500 respectively (Marketing Playbook, 
2009). This paper will focus on the EU definition, and, to differentiate, will refer as 
appropriate, to SME10 (1-10 employees) SME50 (11-50 employees) and SME250 
(51-250 employees).  
 
Some seminal academic research on SME information security actually took place in 
Southern Africa, before BS7799 became an International Standard. Here, a model was 
proposed (von Solms, 2001) for an incremental approach to BS7799, acknowledging 
the difficulty, but worthiness, of the then BSI standard. An MBA thesis relating to the 
difficulties involved in making BS7799 more approachable for SMEs resulted in a 
significant academic paper, which appeared just prior to the International Standard 
(Upfold & Sewry, 2005), and influenced subsequent UN recommendations (United 
Nations, 2005). SME research continues in Africa. In Europe the best and most recent 
SME-focused research that the consortium could find from within the EU have been 
another paper from Barlette (Barlette & Fomin, 2008), a study of German SMEs 
conducted in 2007/8 (Kluge & Sambasivam, 2008), and more recently a study in 
Spain (Sanchez et al, 2009). These all provided useful input for developing the 
IASME model, as did Pacific studies involving a maturity model and SMEs based in 
Taiwan (Chiang et al, 2008), and a study relating to SME culture in Australia 
(Dojkovski et al, 2007). Five years after Coles-Kemp’s SME focus groups, the 
University of Worcester carried out its own research (Arthur, 2009), and this revealed 
further insights into not only the low level of priority attributed to information 
security, but also some of the reasons why many of them apparently had such little 
apparent interest in engaging with information security. 
 
UK Government-backed research (BERR, 2008) provides information security related 
data including SMEs on an annual basis. This was used extensively to provide 
longitudinal analysis, and because it was felt that this would carry considerable 
weight as we sought suitable SMEs to participate as IASME pilots. Another useful 
source was the EU-backed body ENISA, and in particular the work of Poettinger 
(2008), which resulted in a “quick-and-easy” risk assessment tool for SMEs. 
 
There was, and continues to be, a rich vein of private sector research. In particular, the 
consortium found that the detailed studies provided by Verizon (Verizon, 2009a, 
2009b) Symantec (Symantec 2010) and PGP Corporation (PGP, 2010), where there 
was differentiation within the data that fitted SME organisational sizes. Much of the 
best private sector research tends to refer to US SMB definitions of smaller 
businesses, but again the annual basis of the surveys was very useful for showing 
trends.  
 
These reports were also produced on an annual basis, which, in conjunction with the 
BERR reports, were very useful for monitoring trends. They have confirmed the 
suspicions highlighted by IASME and others that as larger businesses threw greater 
resources at protecting their networks, the previously unnoticed small businesses 
would be perceived as “weak links”. The IASME consortium had previously 
suggested that this would not only compromise the security of the SMEs themselves, 
but also would potentially provide back doors into the networks of larger 
organisations who are supply chain partners. The information security of SMEs 
should therefore be of considerable interest to their larger supply chain partners. It 
was interesting that the University of Worcester’s 2010 survey confirmed the trend 
identified in the annual security breach reports for larger companies to require some 
sort of evidence of an SME developing an ISMS before they agree to share data with 
them. This trend is still in its early stages, but does seem to be accelerating. 
 
3.2 Creation of the draft IASME standard 
 
As regards the development of an information security standard for SMEs, 
surprisingly little activity has been found from any country. In a previous paper for an 
Atiner SME conference (Henson & Hallas, 2009), the lack of support for small 
businesses in existing security standards, including ISO/IEC 27001 had been 
highlighted. The metamorphosis of BS7799 (BSI, 1999) into ISO27001 (ISO, 2005) 
had been welcomed by Coles-Kemp & Overill in their 2007 paper, but these authors 
felt that this was still not addressing the problem as far as smaller businesses were 
concerned. Certainly a risk assessment that would cross-reference with 134 security 
controls can be readily seen to be quite a daunting task that needs considerable human 
and financial resources.  
 
Earlier research comparing standards had been summarised by Kluge & Sambasivam, 
2008, and had confirmed the authors’ perception that, ISO/IEC 27001 was the most 
comprehensive. It therefore made sense that this should form the basis of any 
information assurance standard for SMEs. One of the consortium members, David 
Booth, already had extensive experience in this area, and is a member of the SC27 
committee that is involved with the production and continual development of the 
ISO/IEC 27001 standard (ISO, 2011) and is familiar with other sources of information 
security guidance. He had been working for some time to develop something that 
would be readily accessible to SMEs. This would clearly take time, and plenty of user 
feedback. It was decided that the best approach would be an iterative development 
with actual SMEs working in different sectors of industry. 
 
3.3 Research on existing software tools that can be used with SMEs 
 
Information risk assessment had been shown by the earlier University of Worcester 
research (Arthur, 2009) to be particularly inaccessible as far as West Midlands SMEs 
were concerned. It was hoped, even anticipated, that tools would be available that 
would assist with the information risk assessment process. However, the tools that 
were reviewed tended to be more suited to larger organisations, with top-down 
management structures and clearly defined processes. One reviewed tool had been 
developed by Joachim Poettinger (Poettinger, 2009) and was adopted by ENISA 
(European Network and Information Security Agency) and this proved to be 
sufficiently easy to use with SMEs to provide useful information about the nine main 
areas of information risk, for a particular organisation. For more comprehensive risk 
assessment that would be able to highlight specific controls, a more rigorous tool 
would be needed, but for a quick analysis, and to get the SME on board with 
information risk assessment, this was an effective tool to use. 
 
Earlier studies reported by Coles-Kemp and Overill in their 2007 paper, had 
suggested that SMEs were only interested in the security of “high risk” processes. 
This would clearly be a concern to be addressed in the development of the new 
standard and process, and a risk assessment model would need to be developed that 
would be able to take into account a process of assessing risk for all information and 
information flows, without becoming too cumbersome for the business. Whilst this 
was considerably challenging, the potential goal seemed so worthwhile that it was 
agreed that the consortium would seek to either find such a tool or (if it proved that 
existing tools were not scalable and/or suitable), develop their own or adapt an 
existing model.  
 
4. Development of the IASME standard 
 
Most small businesses have grown up around a core business concept, and prefer not 
to become distracted by (perceived) peripheral activities. It is necessary to present 
information assurance (IA) as part of core business, providing essential support, in the 
same way as auditing, accounts, inventory, payroll and similar functions. These latter 
functions are thought of as traditional parts of any business, while IA is relatively 
new, but just as important. 
 
The importance of these functions will vary from organisation to organisation, but all 
will apply to some extent. The IASME process reduces the complexity inherent in this 
list using a structured method suitable for SMEs. 
 
Business Security Functions: 
 
Organisation: manage information resources within the organisation and in the 
organisation’s relations with partners. 
Risk: understand and manage the risk to your business information. 
Policy: establish management direction and communications. 
Assets:  know your information assets, and acquire and dispose of them securely. 
People: know your people and educate them in business security. 
Things: protect your information assets from physical harm. 
Malware: defend your information from hostile attack and be ready to recover from 
infection. 
Access: control who and what can access your information. 
Planning: build security and privacy in at the start; make sure you have the right-
sized information systems. 
Operations: manage and monitor your information systems effectively. 
Mistake Management: ensure breaches of confidentiality, integrity or availability of 
your systems are detected and dealt with; learn the lessons ! 
Continuity: make sure you can recover quickly from partial or total loss of key 
information assets. 
Legal Compliance: know what is required and make sure you comply. 
 
 
4.1 Initial draft 
 
It was important that the consortium produce an initial draft as quickly as possible 
based on experience and research input, which could be used with SMEs to get the 
development of the IASME process underway. This initial development was entirely 
the work of David Booth, based on his knowledge of ISO/IEC 27001, and other 
sources of guidance. ENISA, SANS and COBIT also provided useful input on control 
selection.  The total number of security controls was only slightly smaller than 
ISO/IEC 27001, but only a limited number were identified as essential, and the 
application of the others would depend on the target risk profile, so for a particular 
SME the number of controls they would need to consider would likely to be lower 
than for a full implementation of ISO/IEC 27001. 
 
This first draft of the IASME standard was tidied up and clarified for use with SMEs 
in the spring of 2010. The standard uses a Risk Profile to indicate one of three 
identical control sets, where each has the same Essential controls, but the remainder 
of the controls are prioritised according to the risk profile (i.e.  Not Applicable, 
Desirable, Highly Desirable). These priorities can be varied by the Assessor for an 
individual Target of Evaluation (ToE) if necessary as a result of the Risk Profiling 
process. It was important that this rather novel approach was well tested and refined 
during the development stage. 
 
 
4.2 First iteration, based on SME input 
Although the IASME Consortium and the University of Worcester had previously 
been in contact with SMEs, it was felt that representative pilots should be sought, and 
these were selected at random, in terms of those who responded to a questionnaire on 
Information Security that had been circulated. The questionnaire, which was also 
intended for research purposes, is included here as Appendix 2. There were 
unfortunately not a sufficient number of responses for a statistically significant 
analysis of responses, but the exercise served its other purpose in providing some 
SMEs to become pilot organisations for the IASME process. Each pilot would get free 
consultation, guidance, and all documentation in the initial development year. 
 
Initial contact was face-to-face, and generally took between one and two hours. One 
long-established principle of ISO/IEC 27001 is that information security has to be the 
responsibility of senior management. However, this principle is often found lacking in 
the information management of SMEs that have not seriously thought about 
developing an ISMS. For this reason, whenever possible, the CEO of the organisation 
was directly involved. This was not always possible, especially with larger SMEs. 
However, because a number of questions involved senior management and their 
decision-making, no progress could be made without the latter’s input. This happened 
via proxy if necessary, but the completion of required information took longer in such 
cases. 
 
Although the IASME process is intended for all SMEs, part of the initial assessment 
process is to establish the size and complexity (in terms of sensitivity of data and 
connections with external partners) of the organisation; generally the larger and more 
complex, the higher the potential risk. The combination was used to classify each 
organisation as “low”, “medium” or “high” risk. Depending on the classification, 
more stringent controls would be expected to obtain IASME Gold for a high risk 
organisation, in terms of IASME classification. 
 
4.3 Revisions of the IASME Documentation and Guidance 
A number of significant minor revisions occurred as the pilot SMEs engaged with the 
process, to minimize the burden of administration in order to gather evidence that 
processes were in place, and evidence of compliance with requirements of the 
standard. The version of the IASME standard v1.0a included as appendix 3 with this 
paper is the latest version. 
 
Much was learned during the pilot phase about what worked and what didn’t, both 
from the viewpoint of the study team and the businesses. One of the assumptions was 
that time and money could be saved both by standardising the process and involving 
the business. This included developing and supplying templates of key documents in a 
non-technical form intelligible to the business, including a policy structure, an outline 
management structure and a business continuity template. In addition, the risk 
profiling was adapted from ENISA and other guidance to present the primary risk 
arenas in an environment which would be understood by, and self-completed by the 
business (with the oversight of the Assessor). 
 
It turned out that the structure of the policy document could incorporate key 
management commitments, thereby providing the basis of an information security 
management system. Further, by incorporating commitment to the essential controls, 
it could provide the basis of a fast-track improvement and assessment process, 
particularly suitable for micro-businesses of less than 10 people, as long as their risk 
profile remained Simple. Businesses whose risk profile falls outside these parameters 
will continue to be assessed using the normal processes. 
The original concepts were shown to work effectively in practice with some minor 
modifications. Of the three businesses assessed during the pilot stage, one succeeded 
using the fast-track process the remainder were assessed using the normal processes. 
Involvement of the business had the useful by-product of providing some basic 
information security management education, a factor which the businesses found 
useful. Case studies of three pilot businesses can be found on the IASME web site. 
One of the principles behind developing IASME was to make a complex process 
involving risk assessments of many processes and decision-making about many 
security controls as easy as possible for the business. This meant that as much 
information as possible was provided within the documentation, and all that was 
needed for the business to do was confirm the elements of their normal practice, and 
supply evidence. Even so, a number of pilots dropped out of the process due to lack of 
time, as the documentation evolved to the more streamlined v1.0, which was 
unfortunate. It was accepted that SMEs would often need more “hand holding” with 
administration than had originally been anticipated, and an expectation that they 
would find the time to read through guidance documents and provide written or 
digital materials without more direct intervention. A provision for extra face-to-face 
time was built into the funding model for IASME, which is outlined in section 7. 
 
5. The Assessment and Grading Process 
 
The assessment process consists of a Risk Profile Assessment, followed by either a 
Fast Track and/or a Full Matrix Assessment. The RPA has developed from an initial 
manual, rather subjective assessment to a balanced scorecard method, in which 
answers to a questionnaire are weighted and summed to provide a fully documented 
and repeatable result. The FTA is also a balanced scorecard questionnaire, while the 
FMA is currently a spreadsheet calculation. These methods are subject to continual 
improvement; one target is to make much of the documentation and calculation 
available on-line. 
Both the FTA and FMA paths result in a graded assessment: Improvement Required, 
Bronze, Silver or Gold. Three levels of achievement are considered to offer a way for 
under-achieving businesses to improve at their own pace, and this proved to be 
effective during the pilot stage. In the latter three cases, a certificate is awarded to the 
business and their certification is published on the IASME web site. In all cases the 
Assessor will provide an improvement plan, which the business can follow if they 
wish to move up to a higher grading. After the first assessment, businesses are re-
inspected at least once a year and a full re-assessment is carried out every three years 
(at present). The business must also inform IASME if there are any material changes 
to the risk profile between inspections. These inspections are necessary to retain the 
certificate, which will be withdrawn (and publicised) if these conditions are not met. 
Examples of documentation provided for pilot participants and the latest version of 
the IASME standard is provided at Appendix 3. 
 
6. Successful IASME Completions 
 
To date, three of the dozen or so SMEs that became IASME pilots have seen the 
process through to certification, and one small company that had already achieved 
ISO/IEC 27001 has been through the assessment process and obtained IASME Gold 
certification. All received their certificates at the IASME launch, earlier this year 
(IASME, 2011a). The consortium is often asked which SME sector they are targeting 
with IASME, and the answer is, genuinely, that SMEs in all sectors can, and indeed 
should, benefit. The three successful completers to date are one retail company, one 
web design company, and one computer security company. One is a large SME, and 
the other two are microbusinesses. Their experiences with engagement with the 
IASME process are reported on the website (IASME, 2011b), and echo the 
consortium members perception that this is a valuable product for SMEs, with much 
to offer in terms of offering protection against breaches, greater understanding of 
businesses processes involving information, and potential mitigation against action 
from the ICO (Information Commissioner’s Office) under the 1998 Data Protection 
Act, in the event of a breach. 
 
7. Production and Implementation of Business Plan 
 
The pilots got everything free of charge, including their IASME certificates. Looking 
beyond the pilots, IASME will need to be self-funding. A funding model based on 
fixed costs plus extras based on size and complexity of the organisation was 
developed in association with colleagues at NCC (National Computing Centre), who 
also proposed a model for training and development of existing ISO/IEC 27001 or 
equivalent auditors who wish to become IASME assessors. As with another scheme 
developed by NCC for accreditation of good practice in IT departments, incentives 
will be offered to assessors who come across other SMEs wishing to improve their 
information security management. 
 
Marketing will therefore expand IASME as a business through referrals. However, it 
is anticipated that only a small number of leads will be generated through referrals, 
and plans for direct marketing to SMEs are currently being developed. One option is 
to work in partnership with existing ISO/IEC 27001 auditing companies; they gain 
through taking the SME from IASME Gold standard to ISO/IEC 27001 standard, and 
IASME gains indirectly through referral of companies ultimately seeking ISO/IEC 
27001 certification, but only in the early stages of ISMS development. Two such 




A lot has been achieved already through the research & development effort with 
actual SMEs to create the IASME process and standard, and engaging with 
prospective partners in the ISO/IEC 27001 certification marketplace to serve common 
interests.  The review of investigations from around the world was very useful in 
establishing why SMEs – particularly smaller SMEs - are fundamentally different 
from larger companies, have different information systems, and are less willing to 
engage with information security processes. Direct input from working with the pilots 
also revealed the human resources pressures on SMEs compared to larger 
organisations which usually have some spare resource that can be used to gather the 
information required for risk assessment, procedure and policy development, and 
other aspects of an information security mechanism. Moreover, because the SME 
often is already working at full human resource utilisation levels, there would be no-
one spare to look after an information security management system even if the human 
resource had been found to set such a thing up.  
 
In the UK, only small amounts of public money has been used to support the small 
business in developing a secure information infrastructure, with an apparent 
expectation that what happens on a large scale can be scalable to the SME. This 
filtered down into providing support for larger organisations as the law tightened up 
as a result of the data loss incidents of 2007, and anticipating that SMEs will find 
assistance through regional, professional, or industry bodies. IASME consortium 
members would like to think that with their funding from the Technology Strategy 
Board, they have developed a service and information security standard that can be 
used at modest cost by any small business wishing to develop an ISMS, provide legal 
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